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The paper is devoted to the problems of the impact of privatization on corporate gov-
ernance formation in Poland. It discusses the dilemmas of choosing a model for privatization 
and corporate governance, legal background, mechanisms of corporate governance forma-
tion depending on a privatization method applied, and the evolution of these structures in the 
course of systemic transformation in Poland.  
The Author comes to the conclusion that the processes of privatization and corporate 
governance formation in Poland are marked by both successes and failures. The most spec-
tacular success is privatization in the “broad sense” which boosted the growth of new private 
businesses and the share of the private sector in the national economy. Privatization in the 
“narrow sense” (ownership transformation of state-owned enterprises) was only a partial suc-
cess, both in terms of quantity and quality. Some methods of privatization proved to be more 
“permeable,” easier to implement for a number of social, political and technical reasons than 
the others; thus, the progress of privatization was very uneven across sectors, and some of 
them  (infrastructure,  extractive  industries  and  some  others)  remain  predominantly  state-
owned. There were two reasons for this situation: the highly gradualist, consensual character 
of Polish privatization procedures and the emergence of interest groups not interested in pri-
vatization of remaining state-controlled companies. 
Recently, new trends are seen that can be interpreted as a certain convergence of  
corporate governance models and a convergence between the effects of different privatiza-
tion methods in corporate governance and performance of enterprises. Taking this into ac-
count, the Author elaborates on whether the “how to privatize” question still actual and on the 
“feasibility vs. efficiency” privatization policy dilemma. 
 







The paper is devoted to the problems of the impact of privatization on corporate gov-
ernance formation in Poland. It discusses the dilemmas of choosing a model for privatization 
and corporate governance, legal background, mechanisms of corporate governance forma-
tion depending on a privatization method applied, and the evolution of these structures in the 
course of systemic transformation in Poland. In this paper, term “privatization” is used in a 
narrow sense. It means transfer of state-owned stock into private (non-state) hands (unlike 
privatization in the broad sense; i.e., development of the private sector of economy — both 
through privatization of state-owned enterprises and spontaneous formation of de novo pri-
vate companies). The OECD definition of corporate governance is used: the system by which 
business corporations are directed and controlled (OECD, 1999). The corporate governance 
structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in 
the  corporation, such  as the  board,  managers,  shareholders  and  other  stakeholders,  and 
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. 
1. Privatization 
1.1. Intellectual and ideological context. Choosing the model 
Through  almost the  whole  period  of  Communist rule  in  Poland,  serious  discussions 
were held on improving the efficiency of Polish enterprise sector. Unlike most other countries 
of the Soviet bloc, those discussions went far beyond ideas of how to improve the central 
planning system. One of the most popular approaches was that of participation of employees 
in the management of state-owned firms. Apart from purely ideological justifications of such 
an approach (workers as co-owners of the state property), it was believed that employee par-
ticipation would boost enterprise performance by overcoming labor alienation and by harmo-
nizing interests of employees with those of the firm and the whole national economy. Even if 
some of the discussion participants had doubts as to whether state-owned enterprises with 
employee participation were the most effective form of enterprise (especially compared to 
privately owned companies), they believed that in the given circumstances, this was the most 
radical and effective solution.  
In Communist times, there were two serious efforts to introduce employee participation 
in Poland. In 1956, workers’ councils were set up in state-owned enterprises, but their pow-




duction tasks among enterprises. In 1981, a deeper reform of enterprise sector started, with 
employee  self-management  being  part  of  a  new  set  of  decentralized  principles  of  state-
owned enterprise operation, known as “The Three S’s” (self-management, self-financing and 
self-dependence). Thus,  when  the  Communist regime collapsed  in  Poland,  a  strong  self-
management intellectual tradition existed, and groups supporting this approach had arisen 
within enterprises and academia and on the political arena.  
At the beginning of transformation, the attention of the first non-Communist government 
was concentrated on the more obvious, and highly urgent, tasks of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and liberalization, subjects which were perhaps somewhat less controversial than own-
ership transformation. Here, shock therapy measures had been applied, while privatization 
and institutional changes were carried out rather cautiously and gradually (in contrast to the 
mass privatization procedures used later in, for example, the Russian Federation and the 
Czech Republic). Maintaining a balanced budget, combating inflation and ensuring macro-
economic equilibrium as well as introducing a greater degree of economic freedom has al-
ways been included in a standard set of activities undertaken by many countries in the world 
and were applied in Poland with a considerable degree of success. Yet, with respect to radi-
cal institutional changes and large-scale privatization, recourse to existing Western practices 
was impossible, since there was no previous experience on this scale (the privatization of 
entire economies).  
At the same time, there was no consensus concerning the direction of privatization 
processes among economic and political elites, in the government and between the govern-
ment and its foreign and domestic advisers. While agreeing with the main rationale for large-
scale ownership transformation (found in property rights theory, which explained the ineffi-
ciency of the socialist enterprise sector on the basis of incomplete property rights), the par-
ticipants of the discussion had different views on at least three important questions:  
– What type of owner (and more generally — what type of corporate control) is the 
most efficient? 
– What other goals can be met by privatization? 
– What should be done to make the privatization process itself as efficient as possible? 
A general debate on the privatization concept took place in late 1989 and 1990. Three 
main concepts of privatization came up against each other, each providing a separate an-
swer to the aforementioned questions: 
– a commercial concept of the sale of state-owned assets using classical methods, in-
cluding trade sales but most importantly public offerings (based on the British experience); 
– nonequivalent  privatization  based  on  employee  ownership  and  the  US  Employee 




– nonequivalent  privatization  through  free  distribution  of  assets  among  all  citizens, 
based on newly drafted privatization concepts (Błaszczyk, 1993; Gilejko, 1995). 
In its first economic program of October 1989 (the so-called Balcerowicz Plan), the 
government gave preference to the first, “classical” concept of privatization, combined with 
rapid development of de novo private sector which would absorb workforce from the shrink-
ing state and ex-state sector. In turn, the privatization law, passed July 13, 1990, tried to 
make use of all the three privatization concepts in order to ensure the widest possible impact 
of  privatization  on  transformation  economic,  social  and  political  transformation  in  Poland. 
Ideologically, it reflected coexistence of different views on the scope and methods of owner-
ship transformation, and more generally — on the principles of the post-Communist trans-
formation as a whole. The privatization law represents a certain combination of two main op-
tions: liberal conceptions patterned after solutions adopted in developed market economy 
countries, and a participatory approach originating from the Polish labor self-management 
movement and tending towards a kind of “Third Way” of development. 
1.2. Goals and methods of privatization 
During the whole post-Communist period, no detailed description of the main goals of 
privatization was prepared. Only a few of the goals were ever officially mentioned, and most 
of them had to be deduced from decisions made by the Parliament and governmental agen-
cies (Kochanowicz et al., 2005).  
The economic program of the first post-Communist government addressed privatization 
issues in the context of the creation of market institutions which had stood the test of time in 
Western economies. Following that simple course of thought, the main privatization goal was 
of a systemic character: to contribute to the  change  of  the  economic  system  through 
creation of private entities. Within the framework of this goal, a number of sub-goals ex-
isted, of which the most important was the creation of well-functioning markets, including a 
securities market. 
Apart from this purely systemic role, privatization was to solve the problem of micro-
economic inefficiency of state-owned enterprises; this would, in turn, contribute to the rise 
in productivity of the whole enterprise sector. 
Although never officially formulated, the third goal was of crucial importance: to make 
the whole reform process smooth, stable and irreversible. Privatization was expected to 
create not only incentives for economic development, but also to create powerful pro-reform 
lobby of actors, involved in privatization process and using its results. Such a lobby would 
exert strong pressure on decision-makers to continue pro-market reforms. The assumption 
was that a critical mass must be achieved, when liberal and market institutions and actors 




The fourth goal was of a fiscal nature. On the one hand, the value of the state-owned 
stock designated for privatization was large, therefore the potential privatization revenues of 
the budget were also significant and able to contribute to reduction of the budget deficit. On 
the other hand, privatization could lift the financial burden of maintaining loss-making enter-
prises and sectors and thus contribute to reduction of fiscal deficit. 
The fifth group of goals was related to the use of privatization for solving a wide set of 
social problems. On the one hand, attempts were made to attain a kind of social justice (via 
distribution of part of the privatized stock among the whole population and, additionally, by 
creating preferences for certain groups who were felt to deserve such entitlements). Addi-
tionally, attempts were made to use privatization to resolve the social problems in concrete 
enterprises by imposing on the buyers certain obligations concerning employment, wages, 
environmental protection, etc. 
A set of hidden goals existed as well, when the government drew public attention to 
one goal while the real, most important goals were not advertised because they were less 
attractive to the broad public. In some cases we can describe this as an “honest” hidden 
agenda (for example, stressing the social profits from privatization in order to gain public 
support and unblock or speed up the privatization process — e.g., this included preferential 
treatment of insiders). Trying to build a strong coalition of pro-reform forces, the government 
had to bear in mind that different coalition members might have different motivations, so it 
seemed to be politically rational not to spell out the goals. Moreover, given the multiplicity of 
objectives and the constraints, a detailed description of the privatization goals would have 
been almost impossible. 
In other cases, however, hidden goals were less “honest.” For example, they appeared 
in the course of formation of entrenched interest groups which were interested in privatization 
(or more often lack of privatization, e.g. in the sectors where privatization would mean dis-
continuance of public financial support), or some specific method of privatization of enter-
prises or whole branches, primarily in view of the gains they expected to reap as a result. 
Members of these groups rather seldom occupied the highest positions in the government or 
administration; they were influential mostly as lobbyists or voters. 
The problem is that at least some of the goals may be — and in fact were — contradic-
tory. For example, pursuing the fiscal goals sometimes jeopardized the goal of increasing of 
microeconomic efficiency (the more an investor must pay to the budget, the less he may in-
vest in a company). In addition, maximizing global revenues from privatization requires a 
gradual  approach  (because  glutting  the  market  with  privatization  offers  would  reduce  the 
market prices of enterprises), while the tactical goal of reduction of the budget deficit in a 
given year could lead to just such an attempt to maximize privatization revenues in a given 
year, thus lowering the total revenues to be achieved from privatization. Excessive attention Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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to the social obligations of an investor may lead to inadequate investments in the company 
(an excessively high wage bill reduces funds available for investment). The goals related to 
“social justice” (e.g., “enterprises should belong to their employees” or “enterprises should 
belong to the whole society”) contradict the need to find efficient owners for privatized enter-
prises. 
It is quite obvious that contradictions between official and hidden goals can be highly 
destructive for the privatization process, especially in the case of “dishonest” goals. Their 
pursuit not only leads to slowdown and distortions in the privatization process, but has severe 
political consequences related to the corruption of the state apparatus, deceleration of the 
construction of institutions of the market economy, and growing disappointment of population. 
A set of goals on the enterprise level also existed. These were the group and individual 
goals of the managers and employees of state-owned enterprises. Quite often such goals 
were not in line with the privatization policy conducted by the government. This problem is of 
a special importance in Poland, where insiders have very substantial impact on privatization 
of “their” enterprises. At this level, too, we observe openly proclaimed and hidden goals, the 
latter often connected with enfranchisement of certain enterprise actors (primarily managers). 
Another important feature of Polish privatization (and the whole enterprise sector re-
form) is its gradualist, highly consensual character. Its authors were aware of a trade-off be-
tween the speed and quality of transformation processes. They believed that lower speed 
resulting from careful preparation of privatization deals (both in the technical and social di-
mensions) is much more important than massive and rapid formal change of owners, be-
cause the reformed market environment would exert strong pressure on state-owned enter-
prises and force them to adapt and restructure, thus making their privatization less urgent, 
although still necessary. The gradual character of Polish privatization also reflected a choice 
made in the discussion of what should come first: privatization (which would create demand 
for further reforms)
1 or regulation and institutional constraints (in order to create a framework 
for actors’ behavior and prevent tunneling).
2 The gradualism reflected a choice in favor of the 
latter solution. And, last but not least, consensual character of privatization procedures had to 
help in overcoming the assumed resistance of insiders and other stakeholders. 
1.3. Legal framework 
The main features of Polish privatization (multiplicity of goals and its low-pace consen-
sual character) were reflected in the privatization law, which envisaged a wide range of pos-
sible methods and paths of ownership transformation.  
                                                 
1 See Frydman and Rapaczynski (1995); Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny (1995). 
2 For example, see Murrell and Wang (1993). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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The main privatization act is the Act of August 30, 1996 on Commercialization and Pri-
vatization of State-owned Enterprises which came into effect only in April, 1997. Before that, 
the Act of July 13, 1990 on Privatization of State-owned Enterprises had been in force. The 
law distinguish two basic privatization methods: indirect and direct. 
The indirect (formerly called capital) method consists of two stages. At the first stage, a 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) is commercialized, i.e., it changes its legal form and is trans-
formed into a company, where 100 per cent of shares belong to the Treasury (so-called sole-
shareholder company of the Treasury, Polish acronym: JSSP), and begins to operate under 
provisions of the Company Code, common to all entities (except state-owned enterprises and 
a limited number of companies which are governed by special legal acts). At the second 
stage, the sale of the shares takes place in a number of ways: public offering, sale to strate-
gic investor (or combination of these two) and inclusion to National Investment Fund program. 
On April 30, 1993, the Act on National Investment Funds (NIF) was adopted introducing 
a  kind  of  mass  privatization  program  which,  contrary  to  such  programs  in  other  post-
Communist countries, had been designed not only to transfer a significant part of the state’s 
sectors assets to Polish citizens, but also to create a mechanism for actively restructuring the 
companies participating in mass privatization. NIFs received blocks of shares of 512 compa-
nies which undergo mass privatization, and Polish citizens received a kind of vouchers which 
they could invest in the NIFs. It is worth noting, that mass character of NIF program was only 
a demand side (all Polish citizens), and not on supply side, as in other countries where mass 
privatization took place. The NIF program was supposed to accelerate the pace of privatiza-
tion, at the same time providing for restructuring of companies, facilitated by the experience 
of the professional management companies employed by the NIFs. These goals were never 
fully achieved (Błaszczyk et. al., 2001). 
The direct (formerly somewhat misleadingly called liquidation) method consists of liqui-
dation of a SOE in a legal sense; then, the assets of the enterprise (in totality or divided into 
separated organized parts) are privatized in one of the three possible ways (in Poland often 
called “paths”): 
– sale; 
– entering as a contribution in kind into a company established by the Treasury and a 
private investor; 
– leasing (management-employee buy-out — MEBO). 
The last path needs more attention because it was very popular and is Polish contribu-
tion into methodology of post-Communist privatization. A SOE can enter this path only on the 
request and with consent of insiders. A company (as a rule, LLC) with participation of em-
ployees is being set up which leases the equity of formally liquidated SOE. The company 
signs a leasing contract with the Treasury. The contract provisions stipulate that upon re-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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payment of all the capital installments and leasing fees the assets of the liquidated SOE will 
become the property of the company. 
Another method of privatization was provided by Art. 19 of the Act of September 25, 
1981 on State-owned Enterprises. It applies to SOEs in financial distress — the enterprise is 
liquidated and its assets are sold out. Some enterprises in agricultural sector are privatized 
according to the principles provided by the Act of October 19, 1991 on Management of Agri-
culture Property of the Treasury. There are also separate acts devoted to ownership trans-
formation of certain enterprises and sectors of the economy. Recently, a number of acts have 
been adopted which link privatization with sectoral restructuring. 
All methods and paths of privatization are equivalent (buyers pay market price or the 
price  based  on  valuation),  except the  NIF  program,  where certificates of  ownership  have 
been distributed among the population for a small fee. 
The privatization law regulates not only the privatization process itself, but also in some 
cases the initial corporate governance structure, including initial ownership distribution and 
composition of corporate governance bodies. The scope and character of the impact of the 
regulations depends on the privatization method applied (see also the next section). However, 
the common feature is preferences for insiders, both in starting privatization, and in distribu-
tion of shares. Before the privatization act of 1996 was adopted, all privatization deals had 
been initiated or had needed to be approved by the governing bodies of SOEs. In 1997, such 
a requirement was lifted. 
According to the 1990 Act, in indirect (capital) privatization employees had a right to 
acquire 10 per cent of shares at reduced price; these preferences were increased by the 
1996 Act by granting a right to insiders to acquire 15 per cent of shares for free. Another 15 
per cent can be received for free by farmers and fishermen if they were suppliers of the for-
mer SOE (with restrictions regarding the volume of supplies). Besides, the new Act lifted the 
requirement that JSSPs, as a transitional entity, should be privatized within 2 years after 
commercialization. It introduced a legal background for impeding ownership transformation in 
this group of companies.  
Until 1997, the leasing path of direct privatization preferred extremely insiderized pat-
terns of ownership structure: the new company should have been founded by the majority of 
employees,  no  institutional  outsiders  were  permitted  (unless  accepted  by  the  Ministry  of 
Ownership Transformation). The Act of 1996 imposes certain limits on the use of direct priva-
tization paths and the role of insiders in ownership transformation. Limits have been set on 
the size of enterprises (in terms of employment level, assets and turnover); outsiders gained 
a right to take initiative in privatization without prior consent of insiders; in leasing path, at 
least 20 per cent of shares in the new company must be in the hands of outsiders; possibili-
ties of participation of legal persons have been increased. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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To govern the privatization processes, a brand new special structure within public ad-
ministration had do be set up. The Ministry of Ownership Transformation (reconstituted in 
1996 as the Ministry of the Treasury) had to perform functions which had not existed before, 
which for the reformers meant that it had to be organized in a way differing significantly from 
the established culture of public administration in Poland. Moreover, its functions, as origi-
nally conceived, were limited in time (meaning that it was to be liquidated after privatization 
ended). Thus the ministry had to create its patterns of behavior, internal structure etc. in a 
new and uncertain environment, and be very task-oriented (not to form another interest group 
interested in perpetuation of the transition period or, if the end of transition becomes inevita-
ble, adopt “end-game” behavior trying to convert its authority into another, more liquid form). 
This was, moreover, the problem of all new agencies created to serve the process of post-
Communist transformation. 
1.4. Quantitative effects of privatization 
The most striking, and arguably most important quantitative result of the process of pri-
vatization of the Polish economy has been the creation of over 220,000 new private compa-
nies (and nearly 2.8 million private one-person and family businesses), which make up more 
than 97% of all registered firms, employ 70% of the work force and are responsible for 75% 
of GDP (Central Statistical Office, 2005; EBRD, 2005). 
In  Poland,  the  so-called  small  privatization,  affecting the  retail,  catering  and  service 
sectors, was conducted very rapidly: by the end of 1992, 97% of all units in these sectors had 
been privatized. This was a decentralized, “grassroots” process led by thousands of local au-
thorities, virtually without any intervention from the central government. 
Decentralization of initiation of privatization deals in enterprise sector and the high role 
of insiders in this process, together with possibility of establishing management-employee 
ownership, acted as a catalyst of privatization of SOEs. During the first years, MEBOs and 
other  forms  of  decentralized,  “participatory”  privatization  greatly  outnumbered  centralized, 
government-led sales of enterprises. At the same time, the overall pace of privatization of the 
enterprise sector was much slower than had been anticipated. Besides, since the mid-1990s 
we have witnessed a substantial slowdown of the privatization process, which occurred due 
to two main reasons: the stock of “easy to privatize” (in technical, social and political terms) 
enterprises was rapidly depleted, and political pressure for privatization slowdown increased 
(Figure 1). There was a certain revival of both indirect and direct privatization in 2004-first 
half of 2005 owing to activity of the new Minister of the Treasury which was a strong sup-
porter of pro-market reforms and private sector development. However, the prospects for ac-
celeration of privatization in Poland still remain rather dim, because the new ruling coalition Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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which came to power in autumn 2005 opposes continuation of coherent market reforms in-
cluding ownership transformation. 
Figure 1 



































































































   incl. completed cases (without the NIF Program)
"Direct" privatization (completed cases)
Liquidation (completed cases)
 
Source: Ministry of the Treasury data (http://www.msp.gov.pl). 
 
The speed of ownership transformation depended mainly on the industry, size, organ-
izational structure and profitability of an enterprise. The privatization of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing, trade and construction was usually accomplished 
relatively quickly (as technically and politically less complicated — more than half of them 
were bought by managers and employees). The other pole was represented by the largest 
enterprises, especially from infrastructural sectors, mining and metallurgy. Obstacles of a po-
litical  nature  started  to  appear  as  well  (i.e.,  powerful  interest  groups  which  defended  the 
status quo and created pressure on the government to slow down privatization). Apart form 
“re-consolidating” sectoral programs which have been adopted, the 1993 Law on the Owner-
ship Transformation of Certain SOEs of Special Importance for the National Economy was 
passed, which in fact excluded a large number of enterprises from the privatization process. 
Additionally, as it was said above, the 1996 Privatization Law in practice lifted the obligation 
to privatize commercialized state-owned enterprises. As a result, privatization was completed 
only in the case of 67% of state-owned enterprises (Błaszczyk, 2005), and in 2005, state-
controlled firms still produced about 25% of the GDP (EBRD, 2005).  
Thus, the characteristic feature of Polish privatization is quite a large number of cases 
of “unfinished privatization” in the form of about than 500 predominantly large companies that 
were only commercialized, but never privatized (the so-called sole-shareholder company of 
the Treasury, Polish acronym: JSSP), and about 100 companies where the Treasury has Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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stakes of more than 50% (Nawrot, 2003). Moreover, in the National Registry of Business En-
tities (REGON) there are still more than 1300 state-owned enterprises
3 (out of the total num-
ber of 8453 SOEs at the beginning of transition) (Central Statistical Office 1991, 2005). 
Table 1 
 Selected data on privatization of state-owned enterprises 
Performance (2004) 
Turnover profitability 













gross  net 
“Indirect” privatization:  1573         
JSSP  541  234.9  95.5  7.4  5.4 
completed cases
a  355  219.5  91.6  8.5  7.0 
- with participation of foreign in-
vestors  139  75.2  92.9  7.1  6.0 
companies included in NIF Pro-
gram
  512  111.0  95.3  4.7  3.7 
Debt conversion  17  1.9
b  118.9
b  -18.9  -18.9 
“Direct” privatization:  2135         
MEBO  1364  137.5  95.3  4.7  3.5 
in-kind contribution  227  44.0  87.5  12.5  10.9 





Liquidation (completed cases)  1008         
TOTAL  5673  805.3  93.3  7.6  6.0 
a The share of the Treasury is less than 50%. Without the NIF program. 
b In 2003. 
Source: Central Statistical Office (2003, 2005), Ministry of the Treasury (2003, 2005). 
 
2. Corporate governance 
2.1. Intellectual background and political context 
At the microeconomic level, one of the main tasks of privatization was the building of 
efficient  corporate governance  mechanisms that  would  help  to  overcome  the governance 
problems which in Communist times were one of the main obstacles to raising the efficiency 
and productivity of the enterprise sector.  
The choice of the right corporate governance model was not an easy task, however.  
First, there was a question what corporate governance model would be the best for the 
Polish enterprise sector. In developed market economies, two main models existed (Anglo-
Saxon and Continental) that reflected different philosophies of corporate governance, espe-
cially in the field of corporate control mechanisms and company mission. 
                                                 
3 However, the real number of still existing SOEs may be lower, because of problems with up-
dating the registry.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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Pragmatically speaking, the Continental model was more suitable for Poland (as well 
as other post-Communist countries) for a number of reasons: 
– the influence of external control (in the form of commodity, financial, take-over and 
other markets) did not exist or was not sufficiently effective. In such conditions, the efficient 
functioning of internal supervision was of fundamental importance; 
– the  investment  potential  of  the  Polish  population  was  weak,  therefore  the  main 
sources of capital had to be looked for elsewhere. The Continental model assumed the sig-
nificant role of a strategic investor, in Polish circumstances — most likely foreign (and, later, 
also domestic industrial and institutional); 
– both the managerial skills and technical assets of Polish enterprises were archaic and 
not adapted to the new challenges of the emerging market environment. Strategic investors, 
especially foreign ones, were able to bring to a company not only capital, but also a new cul-
ture of management, of company behavior towards its environment, new technology etc. 
Second, the corporate governance model was expected not only to meet enterprises’ 
needs (i.e., their efficient operation), but also serve the transition in Poland in general, being 
a part of the new political, social and economic model. Therefore, the choice of a model de-
pended on social and political considerations as well. Here, the choice between Anglo-Saxon 
and Continental model was not so obvious, because the Anglo-Saxon idea of shareholder 
value suited the ideas of mass enfranchisement of population. On the other hand, the Conti-
nental model was of a more participatory character, which suited the advocates of employee 
self-management and participation. 
Third, unlike green-field companies, privatized enterprises did not emerge out of the 
blue. They represent a continuation (in economic, organizational, social and other ways) of 
the former SOE. The “legacy” of SOEs has several aspects, including the following: 
– the state-owned enterprise had its own organizational structure, with each body hav-
ing its own competencies to which all actors had become accustomed; 
– in most state-owned enterprises, stable structures of power and influence had been 
established, and many insider actors were afraid of losing them after privatization; 
– the mentality and behavior of the main insider actors were to a great extent deter-
mined by their previous experience in the state-owned enterprise. 
Here, a real threat was that entrenched insiders would resist any attempt to change the 
internal status quo. Therefore, there was a popular view that strong owner control must be 
imposed, while taking insiders’ concerns into account. Under such circumstances, the Conti-
nental model seemed to be a good solution (Jarosz, Kozarzewski, 2002; Kozarzewski, 2006). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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2.2. The legal background 
 
So, in general, the Continental model of corporate governance was chosen, with slight 
inconsistencies and alterations caused by ideological and political considerations, as well as 
pressure exerted by the main actors on the Polish corporate governance scene. It is worth 
noting,  however,  that  Polish  policy-makers,  as well  as  their  colleagues  in  other  transition 
countries, were under strong intellectual pressure of Anglo-Saxon economic theories and lit-
erature, which led to attempts to introduce from the very beginning some elements of capital 
market-based relations and institutions as well. Therefore, Polish legislation included possi-
bilities for development of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance solutions, e.g., by introducing 
sound and transparent regulations of the organized capital market and creating conditions for 
its development (e.g., with the help of initial public offerings of privatized enterprises, and, 
later, by introducing new players on the stock exchange). 
The main act which regulates corporate governance relations at a company level is the 
Company Code of September 15, 2000 (enacted on January 1, 2001). It replaces the Com-
mercial Code of June 27, 1934. 
On a company level, it introduces two-tier system with separate executive and supervi-
sory boards. Supervisory boards are compulsory in all JSCs and large LLCs. As a rule, su-
pervisory board members are elected at the shareholders’ meeting (group voting is possible). 
In most cases, supervisory board appoints the members of the executive board (in general, 
the supervisory board’s position vis-à-vis executive board has been strengthened in the new 
Code). Formally, supervisory board has a wide range of powers, especially controlling ones, 
as a safeguard against opportunism of managers. It supervises all spheres of the company’s 
functioning and has a right to study all documentation and to receive all necessary informa-
tion not only from executive board members, but also from every employee in the company. 
Supervisory board’s powers can be fine-tuned in order to reflect the needs of corporate gov-
ernance in a specific company. 
Notwithstanding  its  basically  Continental  character,  in  most  cases  Polish  legislation 
does not take the concerns of stakeholders into account in corporate governance structures. 
For example, there is no requirement to include representatives of stakeholders (e.g., em-
ployees)  into  the  supervisory  board.  However,  the  surveys  show  that  in  many  privatized 
companies stakeholders (first of all managers and employees) are represented in this body 
as a part of personnel policy of core shareholders.  
Another peculiarity of the Polish legal system is that the main vehicle for representation 
of stakeholder interests is privatization legislation, rather than regulations affecting the enter-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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prise sector in general. Thus, there are fundamental differences in the corporate governance 
regime depending on whether an enterprise originated in the state sector or the de novo pri-
vate sector — a situation which is, to our knowledge, not found in any other European coun-
try. Apart from above-mentioned insider-dependent originating of privatization cases and es-
tablishing preferences for insiders and some suppliers in acquiring shares, privatization legis-
lation introduces legal support for stakeholder interests in corporate governance bodies. In 
both cases theses are insiders’ interests in privatized enterprises: 
– in the course of indirect privatization, when employees of the former SOE and some 
categories of suppliers are granted an option for free shares, and employees have a right to 
appoint 40 per cent of members of the supervisory board as long as the Treasury remains 
the sole shareholder; 
– in the companies that have been privatized through commercialization and are em-
ploying more than 500 persons, employees elect one member of the Executive Board. This 
provision is very unclear. For example, it is not known for what period after privatization em-
ployees have such a right. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the polish legal background for corporate govern-
ance can be assessed as good, with strong disclosure and transparency requirements and 
protection from abuse.  
The Commercial Code contains a system of safeguards against minority shareholders 
abuse. Shareholder has a right to appeal against a decision of the shareholder’s meeting if 
such a decision violates the company charter, good practices or the company’s concern. By 
the way, such a right belongs to executive and supervisory boards’ members as well. Minor-
ity shareholders have extended rights for group voting. There are three types of preferential 
shares: 
– privileged shares, giving their holders greater than one and no more than 2 voices 
per share (till the end of 2004, the Treasury can have up to 5 voices per share); 
– golden share; 
– non-voting share (since 2001). 
A voting cap can be introduced for shareholders that possess more than 20 per cent of 
voices. On the other hand, most important decisions should be approved by qualified majority 
of voices on the shareholders’ meeting (2/3 to 3/4). There are provisions against collusion of 
shareholders. Every member of the supervisory board and a shareholder who possess at 
least 10 per cent of shares has a right to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. 
The Act of January 21, 1997 on Public Securities Trading and the new Act of July 29, 
2005 on Financial Instruments Trading that the replaced the previous law, grants a share-
holder or a group of shareholders that possess at least 5 per cent of votes a right to appoint a 
special controller whose task is to investigate a concrete problem of the company’s function-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
 
  19 
 
ing. The same act imposes on a strategic investor an obligation of mandatory bid if he pos-
sesses more than 50 per cent of votes. Such a bid must be also announced when someone 
is going to buy more than 10 per cent of shares. There is a system of safeguards which is 
intended to ensure proper prices for sellers of shares. In publicly listed companies, an inves-
tor must obtain a permission of The Securities and Exchange Commission to pass a thresh-
old of 25 per cent, 33 per cent, and 50 per cent of voices. All blocks of shares which give 
their owners at least 5 per cent of voices must be registered.  
One of the most important means of preserving shareholders rights vis-à-vis managers 
and large shareholders are information and disclosure requirements. The rights of the super-
visory board were mentioned above. The Company Code grants a right for any shareholder 
to ask the executive board for information that is necessary for evaluation of topics discussed 
at the shareholders’ meeting. According to the Act of September 29, 1994 on Accounting, 
financial statements of companies must include information on remuneration of top managers 
and supervisory board members, as well as on any loan they may receive from the company. 
Information must be provided about capital groups (other companies in which the company 
possess at least 20 per cent of shares). The Act on Public Securities Trading provides pub-
licly  listed  companies  with  additional  requirements  regarding  informational  transparency. 
These companies have to publish all information which may influence the price of shares. 
There are special disclosure provisions devoted to selling and buying shares by major share-
holders. It should be noted, that most of the regulations mentioned in the last two paragraphs 
apply only to publicly listed companies. 
On the other hand, there are provisions of the Polish law which are intended to with-
stand the misuse of the above-mentioned safeguards. When a shareholder starts a legal ac-
tion against a decision of the shareholders’ meeting, this does not stops its execution; in case 
if the court decides that the protest is groundless, the suer has to pay a penalty up to ten 
times of the cost of the court examination. A company has a right to deny a shareholder an 
access to some data if it would cause damage to the company. 
Not all problems related to managing conflict of interests of members of the executive 
board, supervisory board, and shareholders are handled in a proper way. The law covers 
problems of personal capital links with other firms and responsibility towards the company. At 
the same time, there is no legal requirement to include independent members in supervisory 
boards, although such a provision can be found in charter of a few Polish companies. The 
Warsaw Stock Exchange has recently introduced a “soft” requirement for listed companies to 
include before the end of 2004 at least 50 per cent of independent members to their Supervi-
sory Boards (see below). 
There is another sphere where conflict of interests is not properly managed. Although 
auditor has to be independent from the audited company (do not possess shares, not to be Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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the company’s attorney, etc.), there is no legal prohibition for an auditor to be simultaneously 
a consultant for the same firm. Moreover, if such an auditor provides bookkeeping for a firm, 
he still can perform audit (except for those part of financial documents which has been pre-
pared by himself). Lack of proper regulations in this sphere is potentially very dangerous, 
which is confirmed by the bookkeeping scandals in the USA.  
In practice, in Poland there are a lot of cases both of abuse majority and minority rights, 
as well as of managers’ opportunism. There are three main causes which make those viola-
tions possible (Tamowicz, DzierŜanowski, 2002; Kozarzewski, 2003): 
– the problems of corporate governance formation in Poland. As a result of consensual 
privatization, dispersed and highly insiderized patterns of ownership structure often emerged 
with strong positions of managers and to some extent non-managerial employees. A wide-
spread weak role of supervisory boards in the corporate governance system is reported in 
the surveys, executive boards often being the most influential body (this situation is jokingly 
called “Vistula model” of corporate governance,
4 as opposed to Continental and Anglo-Saxon 
models). That hampers the effective control of shareholders over managers and outsiders 
over insiders (given generally still weak outsider investorship in Poland). As a result there are 
problems with overcoming the “legacy of Socialism” in former state-owned enterprises with 
very strong position of managers most of them being directors before privatization. On the 
other hand, if a company is sold to outsiders, highly concentrated pattern of ownership struc-
ture emerges which makes possible minority abuses. High role of the Treasury in many firms 
which are undergoing indirect privatization is also important; 
– the inadequate law. First, the law that describes corporate governance structures in 
companies is not instructive enough, too often giving general idea and principles rather than 
concrete solutions. Second, the system of rights and safeguards that regulates corporate 
governance relations within companies is not extremely efficient. For example, minority inter-
ests can be (and sometimes are) abused with the help of anti-collusion provisions. Disclosure 
requirements do not cover all cases of gaining control over a firm with the help of affiliated 
and  subordinated  companies.  There  are  situations  when  mandatory  bids  can  be  avoided 
without breaking the law. Prevention of hostile takeovers by outsiders is also possible. Ma-
nipulations  of  the  dates  of  shareholders’  meetings  are  widespread.  Managers  have  legal 
possibilities of profits stripping and tunneling. Disclosure provisions are often regarded as 
very complicated and there is a widespread opinion among managers, that some of them are 
impracticable. Third, legal acts sometimes contradict each other and overlap; 
                                                 
 
4 The term was coined by Krzysztof Lis, Chairman of the Polish Privatisation Agency at the be-
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– poor enforcement of the law. Nor the courts, neither the prosecutors have sufficient 
capacities or skills to cope with cases of illegal actions in companies. Within the Warsaw Ter-
ritorial Public Prosecutor’s Office a department of capital market offences has been estab-
lished, but positive results are still hard to be seen. Fiscal administration is incapable to cope 
with transfer pricing. 
In  recent  years,  attempts  have  been  made  to  strengthen  corporate  governance  by 
elaborating and introducing best practices of corporate governance. The main idea behind 
this approach is that because legal regulations themselves are incapable of dealing with all 
the problems of corporate governance, a set of principles should be prepared which would 
both serve as instruction on how to behave correctly and as a form of moral pressure on 
companies to introduce these principles. In Poland, two teams prepared their own best prac-
tices codes: the Polish Corporate Governance Forum affiliated with the Gdansk Institute for 
Market Economics, and Corporate Governance Forum affiliated with the Institute for Busi-
ness Development. The idea of the first project was rather to explain the idea and main prin-
ciples of proper corporate governance practice, whereas the second one was aimed more at 
giving concrete suggestions how corporate governance bodies within a company should be-
have, what decisions they are to make, etc.  
In 2002, the Warsaw Stock Exchange has introduced “comply or explain” provision by 
adopting the Best Practices Code for listed companies (updated in 2005), based on the sec-
ond project, but also using some ideas from the first one. As a result, the Code became less 
concrete and instructive, but at the same time tried to show some general ideas of good cor-
porate behavior. The Code includes a few concrete provisions absent in Polish company law: 
– at least 50 per cent of supervisory board members should be independent (they are 
granted extended rights); 
– management remuneration must be disclosed in detail; 
– decisions of the general assembly of shareholders must be formulated in a way which 
makes it possible to sue them; 
– auditors must be changed at least every five years; 
– the special controller must be fully independent; 
– when a company buys back its own shares, all shareholders must have equal rights 
to sell their shares. 
Other provisions seem to be too general and declarative and therefore not enforceable 
in practice. Beginning July 1, 2003, all listed companies had to report whether they complied 
with the provisions of the Code, and if not, what specific provisions were not introduced and 
why. But in fact even the above mentioned concrete provisions will hardly be enforced in a 
majority number of companies, because there is no effective punishment for not introducing 
those measures into companies’ charters and everyday behavior. At most, the WSE can pub-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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lish a list of companies which do not comply with the best practices regulations. Therefore, 
this document is rather a kind of moral obligation imposed on companies, than a strict regula-
tion. However, more and more listed companies at least verbally declare their willingness to 
play “the best practices game.” Compliance (at least formal) to the provisions of the Code is 
also improving. By the end of 2005, only 8 companies out of 254 declared that they were not 
going to comply the Code. The number of companies that declared compliance to all the 
principles increased from 3 in 2003 to 36 in 2005. The most common problem was the princi-
ple of at least 50% independent members on the supervisory board. Only 54 companies de-
clared compliance with this principle in 2005 (which is still a great progress comparing to 3 
companies in 2003).
5 As we can see, there is still a long way to go. 
Attempts are being made to introduce best corporate governance practices also in the 
state-controlled sector of enterprises. In 2004, the Ministry of the Treasury approved Princi-
ples  of  Ownership  Supervision  over  Companies  with  State  Treasury  Shareholdings  and 
Other State Legal Persons. While applying being obligatory in SOEs supervised by the Minis-
try of the Treasury, they can only serve as suggestions in the companies owned by sub-
national governments and in the firms with mixed state-private ownership. The principles are 
primarily directed at state-designated supervisory board members, and serve as compendia 
on the fundamentals of the company law provisions. In 2005, the revised principles were ap-
proved. On the one hand, they include some improvements, e.g., increased autonomy of the 
state-designated supervisory boards and establishing a duty for supervisory board members 
to monitor the use the state aid by the SOE, as well as data on the economic performance of 
the company and the compliance of the company with the set economic performance targets. 
On the other hand, several steps back were taken, e.g., in the field of monitoring the supervi-
sory boards and setting a standard of transparency for SOEs comparable to the level of dis-
closure of listed companies (World Bank, 2005). 
3. Privatization and corporate governance 
3.1. Initial conditions 
The heterogeneous character of Polish privatization led to heterogeneity of emerging 
types of ownership structure. Indirect (capital) privatization included mostly large SOEs, in 
relatively good economic and financial condition, and in sectors whose privatization was po-
litically  uncontroversial.  In  the  “mainstream”  indirect  privatization,  strategic  investors  were 
preferred;  minority  blocks  of  shares  were  distributed  among  employees  and  other  small 
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shareholders. However, one should remember, that a significant number of enterprises (541 
in June 2005) failed to privatize after commercialization and the Treasury remains their sole 
shareholder  (comparing  with  355  companies  where  indirect  privatization  has  been  com-
pleted).  
In the NIF program, most companies are medium-sized (100-500 employees); the main 
blocks of shares were distributed among 15 investment funds (one, the so-called leading 
fund, received 33 per cent of shares, others received 1,93 per cent each); the Treasury was 
the second largest shareholder, keeping 25 per cent of shares, and employees received the 
remaining 15 per cent. 
Direct privatization as a whole included mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, 
even before maximum size of SOEs was imposed in 1997. There is also a significant differ-
entiation within the direct method of privatization: 
– direct sale mostly covered rather small firms which could be easily sold to a new 
owner. At the same time, a modification of this “path,” called “the fast track,” covered enter-
prises in economic distress, and the buyer had to pay off the firm’s debts. In both cases, as a 
rule, an enterprise was sold to one person, so concentrated patterns of ownership were pre-
ferred; 
– on the contribution in kind “path,” the were no clear preferences for a specific type of 
enterprise; however, the importance of this path is very small (only 9.7 per cent of all direct 
privatization cases); 
– for leasing (MEBOs) a specific category of SOEs suited more: rather small or me-
dium-sized (in order to be affordable for employees), and in rather good economic and finan-
cial condition (in order to produce enough profit to pay leasing fees and do not need immedi-
ate investments). Legal requirements predestined highly insiderized and to a large extent 
dispersed ownership structure. 
The second factor that strongly influenced the post-privatization processes was to a 
greater or lesser extent “artificial” character of initial  ownership structure in a majority of 
companies, set by the privatization method or “path” applied and/or other administrative deci-
sions. As a consequence, after privatization, widespread adaptive processes were set in mo-
tion. In terms of ownership structure, two main processes were seen: towards concentration 
and towards outsiderization, i.e., transfer of shares from insiders to outsiders. Later on, these 
processes of property transfer from one category of owners to another slowed down; at the 
same time, transfers within the same shareholder category intensified (e.g., among industrial 
investors). The processes of concentration and outsiderization did not led to a high degree of 
unification of ownership structure; we witness rather more or less strong path dependence, 
the impact of “privatization history” of a company on the way its ownership, corporate gov-
ernance and behavior patterns were forming (Kozarzewski 2003). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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3.2. Corporate governance patterns 
Among emerging corporate governance patterns, at least three deserve special atten-
tion, all of them formally staying within the Continental model. 
The first pattern is represented by the largest companies which went through “indirect” 
privatization and have concentrated ownership structures, often dominated by foreign inves-
tors. In the sector of former SOEs, they are unquestionable leaders in post-privatization re-
structuring and creation of highly efficient corporate governance structures and behavior.  
The ownership structure of this group of companies is highly concentrated (and the 
concentration level is still growing), and insiders’ participation is very limited, unlike in privat-
ized SMEs and in spite of the pro-insider provisions of Polish privatization law (half-price and 
free shares for employees in the case of indirect privatization). 
In most such companies, deep changes in corporate governance structures have been 
introduced, and the “legacy” of the state-owned past has already been overcome (Kozar-
zewski, 2002). Thus, the processes of post-communist corporate governance transformation 
are complete. However, changes in corporate control mechanisms appear to be conditional 
on the characteristics of the controlling shareholder(s). The companies with the highest levels 
of ownership concentration, especially those dominated by foreign investors, have more co-
herent corporate governance structures. In the companies with the lowest levels of owner-
ship concentration, the shareholders’ majority is often rather formal and does not ensure full 
real control over the company. 
Within  the  pattern  in  question,  companies  with  foreign  investor  domination  deserve 
special  attention.  Corporate  governance  structures  in  most  of  these  companies  are  very 
transparent with clear division of powers among the executive board, supervisory board, and 
general assembly of shareholders. At the same time, the foreign investor keeps tight and ef-
ficient  control over  the firm.  An  important feature  of  corporate governance  policy  in  such 
companies is the introduction of incentives for insiders (primarily managers), in the form of 
small blocks of shares and/or seats on the supervisory board. In this group of companies, we 
observe the deepest strategic restructuring, involving large investments and innovative tech-
nological changes, which leads to the high economic performance.  
During the last few years, however, the gap between domestic- and foreign-controlled 
companies is shrinking. Now, domestic industrial investors in terms of competitiveness and 
innovation do not substantially differ from foreign investors (Woodward et al., 2005). It seems 
that foreign investors should not be blamed for that. This is a result of strengthening of the 
domestic industrial investors who learned how to manage their property in efficient way. 
The second pattern is found in MEBO companies. Most of them used the leasing path 
of direct privatization, although a significant number of such companies emerged as a result 
of  direct sale  and  even  “indirect” privatization.  There  were  two  main  trends  of  ownership Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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transformation  there:  towards  concentration  of  shares  and  toward  their  “outsiderization.” 
These processes had varying intensity in different groups of companies, and three patterns 
of ownership structure have emerged: 
– management-employee pattern (large blocks of shares in the hands of managers, the 
rest dispersed among non-managerial employees); 
– dispersed insider ownership; 
– ownership concentrated in the hands of an outside investor. 
The  most  important  factor  that  influenced  the  direction  and  dynamics  of  ownership 
changes was the economic performance of the company, which favors concentration and 
“outsiderization” of ownership when very poor or very good. In the former case, this can be 
seen as a trade-off between the power of insiders and the firm’s chances for continued exis-
tence. In the latter case, it reflects the opportunity of insiders to reap significant gains by sell-
ing their shares to outside investors. By the end of the 1990s, the post-privatization proc-
esses of property redistribution have been completed in most MEBO companies, and now 
only minor changes can be seen (Kozarzewski, Woodward, 2003).  
Compared with enterprises that have been privatized through indirect methods, corpo-
rate governance structures in MEBO companies seem to be to a great extent dysfunctional. 
A problematic division of powers and functions can be seen in many companies, which is 
caused by unclear principal-agent relations. 
Besides, MEBO companies are characterized by a very high inertia of the authority and 
influence structures which emerged already during the Communist period. Reproduction of 
the managerial elites in these companies (especially with respect to SOE directors and the 
executive boards of the privatized companies) as a rule takes the form of internal “direct re-
production” (Wasilewski, Wnuk-Lipinski, 1995); i.e., one that does not entail shifts of individu-
als within the hierarchy of authority. 
In fact, initially most of these companies had not enough incentives nor capabilities to 
introduce deep changes in their structures and behavior. Most of them were viable profitable 
small and medium-size enterprises at the beginning of privatization, many of them already 
having  their  niches  on  the  emerging market. This  situation made  immediate  restructuring 
measures less urgent, so many companies limited their efforts to shallow and simple restruc-
turing measures, taking additionally into account, that they didn’t have enough capital. A real 
motivation for deep restructuring appeared only when there was a real threat to the com-
pany’s further existence. During the better part of the 1990s, this led to a gradually falling (al-
beit  still favorable)  trend  in  MEBO companies’  economic  indices,  in  contrast  to the  rising 
trend in companies privatized through sales to strategic (especially foreign) investors. By the 
end of the decade however, a large number of MEBO companies seemed to realize that lack 
of restructuring measures might jeopardize their future, and tried to change their behavior, Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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i.e., to start investment programs and deep strategic restructuring. Since then we witness 
steady improvement in their performance. 
As to the ideological underpinnings of this path of privatization, it turned out that claims 
regarding workers’ aspirations for employee participation had been exaggerated. As a rule, 
they did not express a desire to participate in management of their firms, and shares with no 
dividends were as a rule of no use for them (Kozarzewski, 1999). The main motivation for 
workers to retain shares was the fear of unwelcome changes that an external investor might 
cause (lay-offs, worsening labor conditions, etc). The popular idea of capitalism based on 
employee ownership collapsed, but this collapse gave room for the development of corporate 
governance mechanisms based on clearly defined property rights and a strict separation of 
between ownership, supervisory and managerial functions. 
The third pattern is represented by JSSPs, companies wholly owned by the state. Ini-
tially, JSSPs were intended to be a transition entity between the SOE and a private company 
(with this stage lasting no longer than two years). However, in practice, for every third enter-
prise which entered “indirect” privatization, ownership transformation stopped at this stage 
indefinitely. At the beginning, the main cause for this delay were problems with entering the 
next stage of privatization: technical difficulties related to restructuring and preparing a priva-
tization  deal,  lack  of  appropriate  buyers,  etc.  Later  on,  however,  strong  lobbies  emerged 
which were interested in keeping enterprises in this intermediate stage. These included man-
agers who were interested in keeping public support of their companies, and trade unions 
and other organized groups of employees who were not interested in privatization because it 
would lead to deep restructuring followed by shutdowns of loss-making enterprises, lay-offs, 
and liquidation of branch privileges. A separate category of insiders not interested in future 
privatization consisted of the Treasury representatives on the supervisory boards. For them, 
privatization meant the loss of their positions. Simultaneously, after a significant slowdown of 
the entire reform process in Poland beginning in 1992, and increase in clientelist behavior of 
the political elite, JSSPs began to be regarded as a significant asset in the hands of politi-
cians and governmental bureaucracy. The Ministry of Ownership Transformation (and, later, 
the Ministry of the Treasury) proved to be to a large extent incapable of staying within the 
boundaries of a task-oriented organization set up for organizing the process of transition. It  
suffered a growing conflict between its owner’s and seller’s functions: the fewer assets under 
control of the ministry, the less its political weight. This attitude was strengthened by winning 
political parties, which started to treat state assets as spoils that belong to the victors. One of 
the most attractive parts of this “loot” were the seats on the supervisory boards of the JSSPs, 
and for a long period of time the Ministry used them as an instrument of preserving its politi-
cal  importance  and  stability  regardless  of  the  changes  of  governments  (Błaszczyk  2005; Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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Jarosz, 2001). Thus, the Ministry became one of the interest groups working to slow down 
the reforms. 
Although JSSPs are regarded as a highly valuable asset in political struggles, at the 
enterprise level the role of the Ministry of the Treasury as an owner is in most cases ex-
tremely weak: the real priority is to keep this property and extract material gains from this 
possession, and not to manage it in a microeconomically efficient way. It is therefore not sur-
prising that in terms of corporate governance and enterprise performance JSSPs have be-
come the most dysfunctional group of companies included in the privatization process (Ko-
zarzewski, 2005). Most JSSPs were for a long period of time left in an intermediate state, be-
ing neither a “regular” SOE nor a private company, without any concrete prospects or priori-
ties for further ownership transformation, restructuring, etc. Therefore, in practice, existing 
corporate governance structures are characterized by a high degree of influence of manag-
ers and trade unions and the very weak role of the representatives of the Treasury. Addition-
ally, in many JSSPs the spheres of influence of the main actors have not stabilized, which 
gives ground for perpetual conflicts (Kozarzewski, 2003a). 
Notwithstanding generally negative assessment of corporate governance and perform-
ance in the state-controlled sector, in 2004-2005 some positive trends were seen. First of all, 
there was a significant increase in sales and cost reduction, mainly in coal mining and metal-
lurgy.  Some  of  these  positive  trends  can  be  attributed  to  changes  in  the  Ministry  of  the 
Treasury policy aimed, among others, at strengthening its owner’s role and restructuring ef-
forts in the state-controlled sector. This policy included closing down loss-making SOEs and 
initiating bankruptcy procedures it the case of a number insolvent companies controlled by 
the Treasury. It improved performance of the state enterprise sector as a whole, although 
hasn’t raised performance of individual enterprises. Another important factor was increased 
state support for some sectors that were regarded as “sensitive” socially and politically, e.g., 
coal mining. Last but not least, favorable changes in the world markets took place: there was 
growing demand for products produced mainly by the state-controlled sector in Poland: en-
ergy resources (fuels and coal), ferrous and non-ferrous metals (Błaszczyk, 2005). Therefore, 
only a minor part of the observed performance improvement can be attributed to the better 
governance;  besides,  its  sustainability  is  very  weak  because  of  high  dependence  on  the 
situation on the world markets. 
3.3. Capital market 
Institutionalized market is strictly regulated by the Act on Public Securities Trading and 
represented by the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). There is popular opinion, that in terms 
of  organization  and  enforcement,  the WSE  is  probably  the  best  stock  exchange  in  post-
Communist countries.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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However, the list of flaws in Polish organized securities market is still rather long. 
This  market  is  highly  concentrated.  Large  enterprises  dominate,  there  are  very  few 
middle-sized and small companies. Main players are also big, first of all institutional investors; 
small individual investors are numerous, but very weak; their share on the stock market is 
steadily declining (from 50 per cent of total turnover of shares in 2000 to 28 per cent in 
2003).
6 Therefore the concern of small individual investors maybe is not abused, but simply 
ignored. 
The WSE was established mainly to serve initial public offerings in the course of indi-
rect privatization. It is still dominated by privatized sector: more than a half companies listed 
are former state-owned enterprises. The largest ones are those which have been privatized 
by indirect method through initial public offering. Domination of privatized enterprises become 
a barrier for further development of the WSE, because the main task of indirect privatization 
was to find strategic investors for SOEe, and such investors were not interested in keeping 
the companies public, at least at that stage of development of markets. In many cases, they 
were forced to do it by the provisions of privatization contracts; very often only small part of 
shares was on the market. Slowing pace of privatization contributed to further fall on the sup-
ply side. 
During the first decade of its existence, the WSE was not able to gain equilibrium of 
demand and supply. At the beginning, there was huge supply of shares of larges privatized 
companies. Later, the situation has changed: new players were entering the market which 
produced additional demand (e.g., pension funds), and there was not enough supply of stock 
for them. As a result, the WSE represented very small market which has a tendency to shrink. 
Overall capitalization of the WSE was rather low (15 per cent GDP) and showed falling trend. 
At the beginning of the new century, the turnover of the WSE on the cash market was shrink-
ing at a pace of over 20 per cent a year. There were virtually no new entries, and some com-
panies were exiting the market. The total number of companies listed was falling (from 230 
by the end of 2001 to 216 by the end of 2002 and 203 by the end of 2003). Thus, the WSE 
did not properly perform two basic functions of a stock exchange: valuation and a source of 
capital for private sector. The irony is that the Treasury was the largest beneficiary of capital 
inflow through the WSE. 
Fortunately, negative trends reversed in 2004. The WSE started to grow both in terms 
of turnover and number of companies listed. This happened due to both increased privatiza-
tion activity of the new Minister of the Treasury, who previously was a Chairman of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission and favored initial public offerings, and to increased de-
mand of private companies for resources obtainable on the stock market. What is important, 
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this time the WSE expansion was based not only on privatization deals, but also on de novo 
private companies. By the end of 2004, there were already 230 listed companies, and 254 by 
the end of 2005. Besides, it is worth noting that the growth was achieved without any relaxing 
of regulations, but to a large extent due to development of market economy which finally cre-
ated both demand and supply of securities at a relatively high level. 
4. Conclusions 
The processes of privatization and corporate governance formation are marked by both 
successes and failures. The most spectacular success is privatization in the “broad sense” 
which boosted the growth of new private businesses and the share of the private sector in 
the national economy. Privatization in the “narrow sense” (ownership transformation of state-
owned enterprises) was only a partial success, both in terms of quantity and quality. Some 
methods of privatization proved to be more “permeable,” easier to implement for a number of 
social, political and technical reasons than the others; thus, the progress of privatization was 
very uneven across sectors, and some of them (infrastructure, extractive industries and some 
others) remain predominantly state-owned. There were two reasons for this situation: the 
highly gradualist, consensual character of Polish privatization procedures and the emergence 
of interest groups not interested in privatization of remaining state-controlled companies. 
Polish privatization and corporate governance legislation is very extensive and covers 
all important spheres of ownership transformation, as well as companies’ and capital mar-
ket’s functioning. It created rather strong legal grounds for corporate governance and crea-
tion of sound capital market. However, in practice, the real corporate governance mecha-
nisms often proved to be inefficient. Minority shareholders abuse is quite common, but at the 
same time legal provisions aimed at minority protection are sometimes used for “majority 
abuse” by minorities that represent powerful industrial interests. There are also numerous 
cases of managers’ opportunism, asset stripping and tunneling. External corporate govern-
ance mechanisms are often weak and do not always ensure effective regulation of compa-
nies’ behavior. First of all, the growing but still weak and shallow capital market must be men-
tioned. 
It seems that there are the following causes of dysfunction in privatization and corpo-
rate governance spheres: 
– lack  of  coherent  concept  of  ownership  transformation  and  development  of  private 
property relations. Some very important issues of interrelations between privatization and de-
sired corporate governance models and mechanisms are still unresolved; Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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– contradictions in the policy of the state (especially concerning securities market, ex-
ternal institutional investors, and the role of insiders), clientelism; 
– not fully adequate legislation: at the same time, overregulated, underregulated and 
misregulated;  lack  of  integrity  which  hampers  meeting  the  goals  of  transformation.  Some 
provisions of the law have political character and are intended to gain support of various ac-
tors. Sometimes, provisions of law are too general and are not instructive enough; 
– poor enforcement of the law and other regulations. 
Privatization  in  Poland  is  characterized  by  high  diversification  of  methods  and  has 
mainly consensual character. SOEs with different characteristics were designated to various 
methods and “paths,” which introduced a strong selection bias, exerted a heavy impact on 
initial ownership structure of privatized enterprises, and on post-privatization processes as 
well, including formation of corporate governance. Formally staying within the boundaries of 
the Continental model, it was highly diversified.  
Recently, new trends are seen that can be interpreted as a certain convergence with 
the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model. The development of markets, especially fi-
nancial and managers’ ones, created ground for a new type of core investors, whose strategy 
is based mainly on the market value of a company rather than some other forms of return on 
investment or based on pursuing some other goals. In 1990s, the popular strategy was con-
centration of capital in one hands and, if a company was listed, initiation of delisting proce-
dure. Now, more and more investors treat stock market seriously and take it into account in 
their strategies. Increased supply of securities without compromising its quality for sure help 
these investors to realize their plans and contributes to the creation of the “virtuous circle” of 
capital market development. 
A certain type of convergence can be seen between the effects of different privatization 
methods  in  corporate governance  and  performance  as  well.  A  lot  of  enterprises that has 
been privatized with the help of methods which are widely regarded as less efficient, in the 
course of the recent years are showing significant improvement in performance that occurs 
manly due to internal factors, i.e., better governance. At the same time, the gap between the 
privatized  and  the  state-controlled  enterprise  sectors  is  still  growing,  although  the  latter 
shows some signs of performance improvement. However, this improvement is not based on 
a steady grounds and is not expected to be sustainable. 
Is therefore the “how to privatize” question still actual? Does it make sense to promote 
privatization methods that ensure rapid formation of efficient corporate governance structures 
taking into account the fact that in a long run, market forces would force deep improvements 
in companies where privatization methods were not able to create an efficient owner and effi-
cient strategies immediately, but were much more feasible politically, socially, technically, etc.?  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 325 - Privatization and Corporate Governance in Poland…  
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There is no simple answer to this question and the problem needs further investigation. 
At this moment it can be said that any privatization in most cases proves to be better than 
none.  Therefore,  less  microeconomically  efficient  method  of  privatization  may  be  applied 
when otherwise a company would stay in the state hands. However, when we have a possi-
bility to choose between privatization methods, it seems that the choice of the one that prom-
ises better corporate governance solutions and higher microeconomic efficiency is advisable. 
Choosing more “feasible” but lest “efficient” method would cost us loosing opportunities for 
fast and deep restructuring of a company, rapid improvement in its performance. It simply 
means lost time that is used by other companies for improvement of their competitiveness. 
Besides, it hampers the development of markets by postponing the introduction of efficient 
market attitudes. It should be stressed that during the transition an enterprise plays a dual 
role being not only an object of some reforming efforts of the government, but also playing a 
role of an active co-creator of market attitudes and relationships. In other words, enterprises 
to a large extent create environment in which they operate and there would be no market 
without actors who play according to the market rules. And, last but not least, it hampers the 
growth of the national economy.  
Another problem lays in the false character of many “feasibility vs. efficiency” dilemmas, 
because following the “feasibility” path (that e.g. favored some social groups in order to gain 
their support for the reforms and/or overcome their resistance to changes) often proved to be 
counterproductive. In a longer perspective, instead of unblocking and/or accelerating the pro-
market reforms, it created special interest groups that caused reform slowdown and numer-
ous dysfunctions and pathologies. 
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